Achieving Local Ownership
in Mine Action
Sustainable development is key to maintaining a self-sufficient national mine action program.
To achieve self-sufficiency, programs must build capacity and transition away from the international
community’s financial and technical support.

by Blake Williamson [ CISR ]
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ntil recently, the concept of a state’s government

states are responsible for confronting issues that exist within

owning a mine action program was a more

their jurisdiction.1 In a mine action context, these issues

speculative than achievable goal. Sustainable

include landmine and explosive remnants of war clearance,

development is an important aspect of maintaining a

mine risk education (MRE) and victim assistance.

national mine action program. To achieve a financially and

To help facilitate the transition process for mine action

technically self-sufficient program, national authorities

authorities and mine action centers, GICHD has provided

must be willing to commit to mine action goals and claim

a guide to assist in identifying goals according to national

responsibility for mine action issues within their countries.

circumstances. Instead of using procedures that correspond

In A Guide to Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to

to specific situations, GICHD recognizes that circumstances

National Ownership, the Geneva International Centre for

vary by country and provides “a structured series of processes,

Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) asserts that sovereign

questions, suggestions and tools” to achieve a transition by
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integrated into the government structure. GICHD explicitly states that “transition requires a commitment
of more national resources with a parallel reduction of
external assistance.”1 In other words, states must consciously decide to support transition while compensating
for reduced international funding to become successfully
self-sufficient.
After making the decision in April 2001 to transition,
Azerbaijan successfully transferred its mine action capacity to national ownership by 2004. Through its experience, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action
(ANAMA) suggested that transition processes require
Mechanical demining in Laos.

three basic elements: “a decision as to what should be
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developed as the capacity of the programme, … a gov-

assessing country-specific conditions, designing a transition
plan, developing an implementation plan and monitoring
progress throughout the process.1
Although the degree of control transferred from a mine
action program to national authorities can vary, GICHD defines transition as “the process through which the international community reduces its financial and technical support,
as the affected state develops the required national programme management capabilities that lead to national ownership.”1 Notably, the transition process is not an end goal, nor
does it mark the end of international cooperation. From the
U.N.’s point of view, transition simply characterizes sustainable development, which is often a prerequisite for meeting
mandate objectives.
H. Murphey (Murf) McCloy, an expert on post-conflict and
conventional weapons destruction with the Office of Weapons
Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), explains that the
overall goal of centralizing control of mine action within the
state is threatened by the issue of multiple mine action programs. This can be remedied through the presence of an organization acting as a coordinating authority.2 According to
McCloy, this means that “the arrangements/compromises nec-
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ernment decision to nationalize the programme, with a
reasonable timeframe in which to gain experience under supervision and then assume responsibility,” and “a strong national manager who understood the process.”3 According to
PM/WRA, ANAMA’s ability to fund program needs internally and on a long-term basis is perhaps the strongest indicator of the organization’s success.
In most countries, transition may take longer than in
Azerbaijan. In very impoverished countries, national authorities may not consider national ownership of a mine action
program to be a priority. For countries suffering from devastated infrastructures and crippled economies, compensating for the withdrawal of external support from mine action
programs is never easy. However, when international community partners recognize and respect the host nation’s sovereignty, authorities will often feel empowered and remain more
disposed to develop their own capabilities in a constructive
partnership with the international community.2 Alternatively,
in situations where the relationship between the host nation
and international partner was formed under highly autocratic
conditions, local ownership becomes significantly more difficult to achieve.2
On behalf of the state, leadership must be interested

essary to centralize control of mine action within the state and

in and capable of fulfilling clearance obligations.1 Hence,

keep separate programs from operating independently are eas-

to achieve a local buy-in, international donors should

ier to achieve.”2 In the event that local authorities or non-state

first select implementing partners that can empower local

actors exercise control in a loosely defined area independent

national leadership.2 Authorities must also possess a clear

of national authorities, non-state actors may maintain more

understanding of implementation challenges as well as the

influence in their local domains than authorities acting on

financial, technical and human resources necessary to fulfill

behalf of the national government and will often see the finan-

Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,

cial benefits of independent programs, therein rendering the

Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines

centralization of control impossible.2 While otherwise coun-

and on Their Destruction.1 Therefore, donors benefit from

terintuitive, a program truly seeking self-sufficiency must be

communicating with implementing partners and enforcing

notes from the field | the journal of ERW and mine action | summer 2014 | 18.2

Blake Williamson is assistant editor at the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR). He
joined CISR staff in October 2010
as an editorial assistant. He graduated from James Madison University in 2012, earning a Bachelor of
Science in writing, rhetoric and technical communication with a concentration in computer information systems.

A deminer defuzes a landmine in Sri Lanka.
Photo courtesy of MAG/Sean Sutton.

compliance through regular reporting.2

opment, and implementation.1 While

A practical, purposeful plan to complete

international donors may not prioritize

implementation of Article 5 and a

the same objectives as their respective

significant financial commitment to the

host nations, emphasis is placed first on

national mine action program are also

core values and the mission of their re-

necessary.1 Moreover, the implementing

spective organizations followed by the

partner must hire local nationals

affected host nation’s needs.2 Particular

capable of growing with and providing

political environments may also affect

leadership to the program. Notably,

the priorities of the host nation as well

while the skills local staff learn from

as the maturity of the local HMA infra-

the international community will create

structure, amount of available funding

desirable employees in and outside of

and conditions the providing authority

the humanitarian mine action (HMA)

places on the expenditure of funds.

sector, donors recognize that, when
dedicated

to

local

To ensure a successful transition,

self-sufficiency,

appropriate measures must be taken to

local authorities retain the ability to

monitor the success of the process. By

minimize the negative impact this

assessing the program’s internal condi-

causes within the local context. While

tions, authorities can identify potential

these components will not ensure the

issues or constraints in the transition

success of the transition process, they

process. Similarly, when analyzing the

will certainly improve the chances that

program, national authorities are able

those in need will receive support from

to evaluate the current state of the tran-

those who can provide it.

sition process. Notably, key compo-
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Once national circumstances are

nents of a successful assessment and

identified, a transition plan and imple-

analysis will include a “consensus on

address,

mentation strategy can help mitigate a

the nature and size of the residual con-

(which is absolutely essential) and an

country’s shortcomings. GICHD divides

tamination and requirements for MRE

effective advocate who will drive and

the transition process into multiple

and victim assistance that the post-

protect the transition process.”1

phases: assessment and analysis, devel-

transition structures will have to

government

commitment

See endnotes page 51
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